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Abstract—Off-grid networks are recently emerging as a solu- 
tion to connect the unconnected or provide alternative services   
to networks of possibly untrusted participants. The systems cur- 
rently used, however, exhibit limitations due to their centralized 
nature and thus prove inadequate to secure trust. Blockchain 
technology can be the tool that will enable trust and transparency 
in such networks. In this paper, we introduce a platform for 
secure and privacy-respecting decentralized data sharing among 
untrusted participants in off-grid networks. The proposed archi- 
tecture realizes this goal via the integration of existing blockchain 
frameworks (Hyperledger Fabric, Indy, Aries) with an off-grid 
network device and a distributed file system. We evaluate the 
proposed platform through experiments and show results for its 
throughput and latency, which indicate its adequate performance 
for supporting off-grid decentralized applications. 
Index Terms—blockchain, hyperledger frameworks, decentral- 
ized identity, ipfs, off-grid networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent emergence of decentralized technologies like 
distributed ledgers has gained significant attention and their 
potential accelerates the moving towards a decentralized 
ecosystem [1] that will shape the Web 3.0 and will enable the 
development of earlier unattainable peer-to-peer systems. As 
the current centralized Internet infrastructure is exposed daily 
by data breaches and identity thefts  with huge finan- cial, 
reputation and privacy costs [2], [3] for businesses and 
individuals, the need for the re-decentralization of the web - 
from infrastructure to protocols, applications and identities - 
is gradually realized. 
Although this transformation has already started, we  are 
still at an early stage inventing the building blocks that will 
allow us to build the future decentralized Internet on concrete 
foundations. The ongoing research is setting a scene analogous 
to the Internet Revolution in 1994 when all the network 
protocols were invented, which led to the later development  
of famous applications like Facebook and Netscape. Similarly 
today, experts are gathering across the world in workshops  
with the goal of designing and building the next generation of 
the Web [4]. 
Off-grid networking is part of this  emerging  ecosystem 
and started back in 80s and 90s, when communities created 
communication networks outside the main grid with the goal 
of connecting and socializing on their own terms and inde-  
pendently of service providers. These community networks 
 
evolved continuously until today, trying to keep up with the 
constant change of the technology, and got a lot of attention  
as a bottom-up approach for either providing Internet access  
to unprivileged populations [5], [6] or for providing local 
applications and services as an alternative  to  the  Internet  
[7], [8]. Even big companies like Microsoft in 2004 [9] 
investigated and proposed off-grid Wi-Fi mesh networks to 
provide ubiquitous connectivity to people at the neighborhood 
level. 
In recent years, official stakeholders like the Internet Soci- 
ety (ISOC) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
introduce community networks and off-grid networking as a 
valid approach to connect the 4 billion yet unconnected all 
over the world [10]–[12]. 
Underserved rural areas remain one of the least attractive for 
investment by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) but at the same 
time they offer a great opportunity for off-grid networking 
solutions that will boost their potential in agriculture and local 
industry, but also solve their issues in healthcare, education 
and governance [13]. Others claim that “It’s time to move  
from Broadband to Infrastructure” in order to assure network 
neutrality and unlock a more innovative business model [14]. 
However, current off-grid solutions struggle to guarantee 
transparency, decentralization and trust among the network 
participants using legacy protocols and most of the time 
centralized Internet protocols for services like identity man- 
agement and data storage. In order to fill this gap, we designed 
a scalable architecture and leveraged open-source, state-of-the- 
art software for delivering an integrated solution that issues 
identities and stores data in a decentralized way. 
 
 
Figure 1: A Decentralized Off-grid Network 
We address the challenges that pertain to identity and data 
management and apply the concept on an already established 
off-grid communication device called MAZI [15], [16]. MAZI 
enables impromptu network formation among users through 
peer-to-peer communication links. A MAZI node is a Rasp- 
berry Pi to which people can connect using their Wi-Fi devices 
and access services, even in settings with no access to the 
Internet. We augment this open-source toolkit with blockchain 
and decentralized technologies to enable the deployment of an 
open, decentralized and trusted data sharing infrastructure. 
In summary, our main contribution is the design and im- 
plementation of a blockchain-based platform for deploying 
DEcentralized Off-grid Networks (DEON). More specifically: 
• We design and develop a data management layer for 
transparent exchange of data across a distributed network 
in a secure and private manner. 
• We design and develop an identity management layer for 
enabling network participants to control access to their 
identity data and be self-sovereign, namely be in con- 
trol themselves over who gains access to their personal 
information and for what purposes. 
• We combine Hyperledger Fabric, Hyperledger Indy and 
Hyperledger Aries towards an integrated solution for 
permissioned blockchain networks. 
• We install the developed platform in a network of single- 
board computers (Raspberry Pi) and evaluate its perfor- 
mance in off-grid settings. The results show reasonable 
throughput and latency that can empower a plethora of 
off-grid use cases. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
gives a background of the MAZI open-source toolkit, the 
blockchain frameworks we use and the distributed file system. 
In Section III, we present the architecture of the DEON 
platform, and subsequently in Section IV we describe in detail 
the DEON components. Section V presents the performance 
evaluation of the platform, and Section VI describes related 
work. Section VII concludes with directions for future work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The inspiration for the acronym DEON comes from the 
Greek word  “ ΕΟΝ,”  which  is  the  root  of  the  English  word 
“deontology,” and means something that is due and 
appropriate, a duty, an obligation. The metaphor is that our 
DEON platform gives - as is due - users off-the-grid access   
to their right to connect with each other and share data and 
services in a way that respects the principles of privacy, 
decentralization, user-centric data and self-sovereign identity. 
A. Network Infrastructure 
DEON’s network infrastructure is based on the MAZI 
open-source toolkit, a concrete set of hardware components, 
open-source software, artefacts and guidelines, which enables 
citizens to deploy their own off-grid networks, MAZI Zones. 
The hardware platform employed is the Raspberry Pi, option- 
ally accompanied by off-the-shelf equipment like Wi-Fi USB 
adapters, Wi-Fi routers and USB disks, which enhance the 
provided functionalities of a MAZI zone. The MAZI software 
is a set of graphical interfaces and services intended for use  
by diverse groups  of  people,  from  network  administrators 
to urban activists and artists. The user-friendliness of the 
interfaces enables the effortless configuration of the employed 
hardware and the management of various services, such as   
the configuration of the Wi-Fi Access Point parameters, the 
setup of a wireless mesh network, the collection of sensor 
measurements and the sharing of files. 
The toolkit is following the DIY concept,  allowing  the  
user to select, buy and assemble  low-cost  equipment, load 
the MAZI software and consequently deploy one or more 
MAZI nodes in the desired area. A MAZI node exposes a Wi-
Fi network that provides local applications and services. In 
addition, multiple MAZI nodes can be deployed in proximity 
connecting with each other and forming a Wi-Fi mesh network 
that expands the coverage area and brings closer people from 
distant neighborhoods. 
The process of deploying and maintaining a MAZI Zone   
is comprehensively documented, targeting technology-savvy 
users as well as users without any technological background. 
This has stimulated adoption by communities for various 
scenarios; MAZI counts nearly 50 known deployments in 
Europe, Africa and South America serving hundreds of users 
[17]. Apart from the reported MAZI Zones, there are other 
unreported deployments operating either online or offline that 
will never be known to the public since this is the choice of 
the community operating them. 
However, although the MAZI toolkit is offering a decent 
pool of applications and services operating in an off-grid 
network, the data and identity layers of a MAZI Zone are    
not distributed, but instead there is a super node that hosts all 
the databases and identities of the network. This can cause 
serious complications in such networks where transparency 
and security are essential ingredients to establish trust among 
the participants. 
 
B. Blockchains 
An off-grid network is a distributed system, and thus inherits 
all of the distributed systems’ characteristics and advantages, 
but also their challenges and limitations. One of the key 
challenges in such systems is the mechanism for reaching 
consensus among the nodes for concepts like file ownership, 
identities and data storage. A blockchain can address these  
challenges by providing a transparent method of communica- 
tion, storing data and issuing identities. 
Public permissionless blockchains are (aiming to be) per- 
fectly decentralized and secure, but they require a lot of 
resources to operate and do not scale efficiently. Private per- 
missioned blockchains sacrifice some of their decentralization, 
but they are scalable and at the same time can be lightweight 
and secure. We are using a private permissioned approach of 
combining multiple ledgers, each one for a specific purpose. 
A permissioned blockchain can establish the foundation for 
building trust in an off-grid network, where digital identi- 
ties and data exchange methods are managed by distributed  
ledgers, smart contracts and tamper-proof storage. 
One of the most advanced initiatives for developing per- 
missioned blockchains is the Hyperledger Project [18], which 
is hosted by the Linux Foundation and provides an umbrella 
for several enterprise-grade, open-source distributed ledger 
frameworks and associated codebases. Its goal is to provide 
the infrastructure for the development and operation of robust, 
industry-specific applications, platforms and hardware sys- 
tems to support cross-organizational transactions. Currently, 
Hyperledger hosts several distinct projects going beyond dis- 
tributed ledger frameworks, to include smart contract engines, 
client libraries, graphical interfaces, utility libraries and sam- 
ple applications. Hyperledger technologies have been used 
commercially for pilots in full operational use in several 
sectors, including supply chain, healthcare, education, IoT, 
entertainment and financial services. We utilize three projects 
of the Hyperledger ecosystem and build on them to implement 
core functionalities of our system. These are Hyperledger 
Fabric, Hyperledger Indy and Hyperledger Aries. 
Hyperledger Fabric [19] is one of the most popular and 
adopted blockchain frameworks. The codebase was initially 
open-sourced by IBM in July 2017 and is currently maintained 
by a large community of over 300 developers, 45 companies 
and 100+ individuals, who managed to release an LTS (Long 
Term Support) version 1.4 in January 2019. Fabric provides a 
modular architecture for execution of smart contracts (called 
chaincode), pluggable consensus and an identity management 
service. The Fabric network consists of Peer Nodes, which  
execute the smart contracts and host the ledger, an Orderer 
Service, which ensures the consistency of the blockchain, 
orders the blocks and distributes them back to the Peer Nodes, 
and an Identity management Service (called Membership Ser- 
vice Provider or MSP), which handles the identities of the 
network components and the users, using X.509 certificates 
issued by a Certificate Authority (CA). 
Two of the biggest advantages of Fabric is that it uses 
standard, general-purpose programming languages (Python, 
Go, Java, Node.js) instead of blockchain-specific languages 
(e.g., Solidity for Ethereum) and does not rely on a cryptocur- 
rency,  although it can support one. In terms of performance,   
it can achieve end-to-end throughput of up to 1k transactions 
per second per channel and scales well to over 100 peers, 
depending on the network parameters [20]. In addition, there 
are recent studies that claim reaching throughput of up to 
20000 transactions per second in a Fabric network after certain 
architectural changes [21]. 
We chose Fabric as our data logistics ledger to store 
pointers to our data, which are stored in the InterPlanetary File 
System (IPFS). Furthermore, we leverage Fabric’s chaincode 
functionality, which together with a Decentralized Identity 
management system incorporates trust in the transactions 
happening in the off-grid network and enables the development 
of the business logic for diverse applications. 
Indy [22] gathers experts from the Internet identity stan-  
dards community, whose shared passion for a privacy-focused 
design of an Internet-wide identity layer establish it as the 
ultimate tool for self-sovereign identity. The main goal  of 
Indy is to support independent identity rooted on a distributed 
ledger and contribute tools to other blockchain frameworks for 
providing interoperable digital identities. Sovrin Foundation 
[23] operates a public Indy instance, where a network of over 
40 nodes (called Stewards) maintains a public-permissioned 
ledger allowing anyone to read and transact with it, but only 
Stewards to write to it. Only public data are stored on the 
ledger, like public keys and credential definitions, while private 
data are stored off-ledger in users’ premises, enabling secure 
peer-to-peer interactions. 
The Aries project [24] is the client-side software of Indy’s 
code repository, namely SDK and agents, which was disag- 
gregated and moved to a new Hyperledger project in order to 
provide blockchain-agnostic components to the community. 
We use the Indy and Aries frameworks and by extension 
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), which are a new type of 
identifier for verifiable, “self-sovereign” digital identity. They 
are fully under the control of the DID subject and eliminate 
the need for a centralized authority or identity provider, which 
could be either absent or inaccessible in a completely offline 
setting of such networks. In addition, we give control of 
identity data back to the users of our platform by keeping 
private data at the devices of the users. 
C. IPFS 
IPFS [25] is a peer-to-peer distributed file system with 
increased mainstream adoption aspiring to be the file system of 
the Web 3.0 and re-decentralize the way the Internet operates. 
It is a content-addressable network that combines successful 
protocols from other peer-to-peer systems, but also evolves 
them providing a single cohesive system. It uses Distributed 
Hash Tables (DHTs) as a lookup service and as a routing table 
to find the stored data, a BitTorrent-inspired protocol to ex- 
change the data and a content-addressable way for storing data 
inspired by Git’s Merkle DAG. Although it makes possible to 
distribute high volumes of static data with high performance, 
it lacks support for dynamic data such as modern websites. 
Thus it makes a perfect match with a blockchain, serving the 
actual files in IPFS and storing the IPFS Content Identifiers 
(CIDs) on a ledger in order to timestamp and secure them as 
well as to keep them updated and enable data discovery. 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In this section we introduce the DEON architecture and the 
DEON core processes for data and identity management, and 
subsequently explain the transaction flow. 
A. DEON Overview 
We use state-of-the-art Web 3.0 technologies in order to 
provide an integrated platform for deploying scalable networks 
for off-grid, transparent communications between individuals 
and things. Individuals, communities, or enterprises can utilise 
the platform to design, deploy and manage their own commu- 
nication infrastructure that will operate in a fully decentralized 
manner, guaranteeing security and transparency and eliminat- 
ing the need for any super node or other external Trusted Third 
Party (TTP). The main components of DEON are summarized 
in the following: 
• An off-grid communication toolkit that provides the mech- 
anisms to deploy off-grid networks offering local appli- 
cations and services. 
• A general purpose ledger for storing data logistics to al- 
low data privacy, efficient data discovery and subsequent 
auditing. 
• A ledger specifically designed for allowing decentralized 
identity management of user identities. 
• A distributed file system for fast data discovery and 
resilient access to data, independent of low latency or 
connectivity to the Internet. 
An off-grid communication device provides the network 
infrastructure of the system, supporting the deployment of a 
Wi-Fi mesh network, where users connect and have access    
to local, decentralized applications. Users utilize DIDs to 
authenticate themselves in any of their interactions with a 
DEON application or another network user. 
Data and identity management are performed through the 
usage of distributed ledgers (Fabric and Indy) which DEON 
nodes host. The purpose of using the distributed ledgers is 
twofold: on the one hand, to store pointers to real data hosted 
by a distributed file system (IPFS), and on the other hand to 
support self-sovereign identities and verifiable credentials. A 
sketch of the architecture is shown in Fig. 2. The components 
are explained in detail in the sequel. 
 
Figure 2: DEON software architecture 
 
B. Applications Marketplace 
DEON enables a marketplace of applications which vary     
a lot, from social applications like file sharing, chatting, and 
digital voting, to IoT applications like anomaly detection in 
sensor measurements, and more enterprise-driven applications 
like contract signing and service level agreement monitoring. 
These applications use the data management layer to store  
data logistics and the identity layer for authentication and 
authorization of their users. 
Applications in DEON are decentralized, taking advantage 
of the underlying decentralized infrastructure that is shaped 
from the deployment of distributed ledgers. Their front-end is 
stored in the distributed file system, while they use the DEON 
Core Service as shown in Fig. 3 to store transactions, sign 
transactions, authenticate an identity that wants to make an 
action in the network or discover data. Applications use also 
DIDs to authenticate themshelves and sign their transactions 
enabling the introduction of new applications in the network 
and their decentralized, on-the-fly registration and authentica- 
tion. 
 
Figure 3: DEON Decentralized Marketplace 
 
C. Distribution and storage of data in DEON 
DEON manages data coming from applications by lever- 
aging both Fabric’s ledger and IPFS. Applications send data  
to the Core Service which translates them to IPFS commands 
to store the actual data and to Fabric transactions to store   
data logistics and metadata. In this way, DEON eliminates 
central servers and promises secure peer-to-peer exchange of 
data with great performance. By removing super nodes, data 
are not owned or controlled by any of the nodes, bringing 
fairness and openness to the network. IPFS manages the data 
distribution across the network by storing file objects and 
DHTs and pushing files to users if and only if they ask for 
them. In addition, as a distributed file system, IPFS brings 
resiliency even without Internet access, keeping the network 
alive in case of a node disconnection or node failure. 
On the data logistics part, Fabric’s ledger stores pointers 
(hashes) to the actual data in order to enable later their 
discovery from other nodes and the auditing of the transaction 
history across the network. The pointers act as evidence that   
a transaction is made and are stored on Fabric’s ledger, so  
that they can be accessed by any node. Furthermore we use 
Fabric’s private data mechanism [26] to guarantee that only 
authorized nodes are able to retrieve sensitive data from IPFS 
(more details in Section III-E). 
D. Identities in DEON 
We replace Fabric’s native approach for user identities with 
a decentralized identity architecture that uses Zero-Knowledge 
Proofs, Verifiable Credentials (VCs) and pairwise DIDs, en- 
abling self-sovereign identities. This is accomplished by lever- 
aging the Indy and Aries frameworks and their privacy-by- 
design tools (see Section II-B). We follow a similar approach 
as in DEON’s data management layer, where no private data 
are stored on-chain, but only pointers to them. 
The actual identity data are stored in digital wallets, hosted 
by users’ mobile devices (smartphones, tablets, laptops) which 
{ } 
act like password managers and store Personal Identifiable 
Information (PII), such as VCs, DIDs and private keys. Upon 
their connection to the Wi-Fi network of one of the DEON 
mesh nodes, users get a DID and a VC which are stored in 
their private wallet for proving that they are members of the 
network. On the applications side and as described before, 
DEON applications send data transactions to the Core Service 
paired with their DID which are then signed by Aries agents 
and are forwarded to the Fabric network for verification and 
commitment. 
The management of the aforementioned identity data within 
the DEON architecture is handled by Aries agents which 
connect to the local Indy ledger to issue DIDs and VCs to 
both users and applications, sign transactions, ask for users’ 
connection endpoints and validate transactions’ signers by 
verifying their proofs. By the VC-DID-based user authen- 
tication we verify that the user is a valid member of the 
network and he has the rights to use a specific application,  
and by the VC-DID-based transaction verification, we verify 
that the transaction is coming from a node of the network. The 
former eliminates adversarial users while the latter eliminates 
adversarial applications and nodes. 
Finally, DEON DIDs and VCs - inheriting Indy’s char- 
acteristics - are interoperable across local applications and 
services, the public Sovrin network and other Decentralized 
Identity systems as well, following the standards defined in 
W3C [27] and DIF [28]. In addition, network users are able   
to interact in a direct peer-to-peer manner through their agents 
and selectively disclose information during their interactions 
with other users as well as with the platform. 
 
E. Transaction flow 
In the following, we describe the flow of a voting transaction 
invoked by one of the applications of the DEON market- 
place, introduced in Section III-B. The specific transaction’s 
chaincode1 uses Fabric private data collections, but a similar 
approach applies for any other transaction that could happen 
within a DEON network, e.g., file transaction, sensor transac- 
tion, legal transaction or even a coin transaction. 
1) Pushing a vote: As shown in Fig. 4, the invocation of 
a voting transaction consists of five phases. First, the vote       
is sent to the Core Service by a  local  application coupled 
with the application’s DID and vote metadata. Then, the Core 
Service signs the transaction, pushes the data  to  IPFS and 
gets back the CID (ipfs  hash) representing the IPFS object.  
In the third phase, the ipfs hash is pushed to the chaincode 
concatenated with a random value (salt) which will be used by 
the Fabric peer to create a hash which will be stored on the 
ledger (public hash). The fourth phase is the verification of  
the application’s identity by the peer’s MSP. During the fifth 
phase, the chaincode pushes the public hash (public hash = 
hash  salt + ipfs  hash ) to the Fabric ledger and the values   
of the salt and ipfs hash to the private databases of the peers. 
 
1DEON chaincode using private data collections: https://github.com/off- 
grid-block/off-grid-cc/tree/master/vote 
 
 
Figure 4: Transaction flow in DEON 
 
2) Querying a vote: An application can query the DEON 
platform for a vote using the voteID (voteID = pollID + 
voterID). The Core Service queries the chaincode and, after 
the identity verification, the chaincode gets the salt and the 
ipfs hash of the vote from the local peer’s private database. 
Then, the Core Service queries again the chaincode to get     
the public hash of the vote from Fabric’s  ledger.  In  this  
way, the public hash is compared against the hash from the 
peer’s private database in order to verify that it has not been 
compromised. Finally, the Core Service gets the actual vote 
data from IPFS using the ipfs hash and forwards it to the 
application. 
IV. DEON COMPONENTS 
In this section we describe in more detail each of the DEON 
components. shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 5: DEON software components 
 
A. Core Service and Data Storage 
At the heart of the platform lies the Core Service, which 
acts as a middleware and joins the identity management 
components with the data logistics ledger and the distributed 
file system, while it also exposes all the functionalities to the 
application level. It is hosted by all the network nodes and it 
uses a Fabric client to interact with the local Fabric ledger and 
enable data discovery and data access control. 
The Core Service is private-by-design and it ensures that  
no private data like votes, files, chat messages, or sensor 
measurements are stored on-chain, while it also guarantees  
the discovery of data by legitimate users. It exposes all its 
complex functionalities through a REST API, which enables 
applications to send data transactions coupled with user DIDs 
that are being forwarded to the underneath components for 
authentication and access control. 
The Core Service takes advantage of the extensions in 
Fabric SDK Go described in Section IV-B that enable support 
for DIDs and the connection with an Aries Agent, namely an 
aca-py agent [29]. It calls the aca-py agent for actions such as 
getting a signing DID or signing transactions with DIDs. 
The connection with IPFS is achieved through the IPFS Go 
API, which is used to push or retrieve data from the distributed 
file system. The CIDs acquired from IPFS are stored either    
in Fabric’s private data collections in case of sensitive data   
or on Fabric’s ledger in case of non-sensitive data. As a 
complementary security measure in order to prevent dictionary 
attacks, we hash the CID of sensitive data coming from IPFS 
appended with a random ”salt” before storing them in private 
data collections. Metadata attributes from transactions are also 
stored on-chain, as they will later facilitate the discovery of 
the data by applications of other nodes and will enable the 
collection of usage statistics. 
B. Identity Management 
Decentralized identity data are integrated in Fabric by 
extending the functionality of Fabric components, like the 
chaincode interface and the Fabric SDK Go, and by developing 
a custom MSP for the verification  of  DIDs.  Fig.  6  shows 
the architecture of a DEON node - from the perspective of 
managing identities - which eliminates the need for Certificate 
Authorities. 
More specifically, a custom Fabric MSP – the “Indy MSP” 
– is developed to verify and attest Indy’s DIDs, Verifiable 
Credentials and Proofs. Similar approaches have already been 
followed by the Fabric community for implementing other 
custom MSPs (e.g., an Idemix MSP [30]). Regarding the 
chaincode, we extended the client identity chaincode library to 
be able to retrieve and manage attributes from an Indy DID in 
order to make access control decisions based on them. Finally, 
the Fabric SDK has been extended to support provision of 
DIDs and signing of transactions based on them. 
The distributed ledger for enabling the decentralized iden- 
tities is the Indy ledger, which is a public (within the DEON 
network) permissioned one, is deployed in all DEON nodes 
and hosts identity records. 
For the communication between users or other interactions 
involving DIDs, we leverage existing Aries agents to serve   
as clients of decentralized identities. We deploy an enter- 
prise/cloud Aries agent, application agents and mobile edge 
 
 
Figure 6: Technical architecture of the integration of Fabric 
and Indy 
 
agents. The cloud agent is installed on DEON nodes and plays 
the role of the issuer of DIDs and VCs as well the role of the 
verifier/MSP of DID-based Fabric transactions. The applica- 
tion agents are the identity managers of applications and are 
used to manage application DIDs and sign transactions. The 
edge agents are installed on users’ devices and enable users   
to store and manage and share their identity data. 
V. EVALUATION 
This section presents a performance evaluation of the pro- 
posed platform in “off-grid settings,” namely an offline, local 
network of Raspberry pi boards, representing DEON nodes, 
where the DEON software components were installed. 
A. Experiment Setup 
We used three Raspberry pi 3 B+ boards2 interconnected 
through a 1 Gbit/s switch and installed an unofficial Ubuntu 
18.04.3 version3  which provides the 64-bit environment we 
need to run the Fabric code. The SD card we used in all Rpis 
is the Lexar High-Performance 633x 32GB microSDHC U1. In 
addition, we had to build the Docker images for Fabric v1.4.2 
(fabric-tools, fabric-ccenv, fabric-orderer, fabric-peer, fabric- 
couchdb) using the fabric-base images for arm64, since we 
did not find any of these available online. The Docker images 
produced are publicly available in Docker hub4. 
Each Rpi represented a different Fabric organization con- 
sisting of one endorsing peer and using couchdb for its peer 
state database. We used the RAFT-based ordering service and 
each Rpi node hosted an orderer to ensure decentralization and 
robustness in case of a node failure. All peers were connected 
2Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+: https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry- 
pi-3-model-b-plus 
3Ubuntu Server 18.04.3 for Rpi https://github.com/TheRemote/Ubuntu- 
Server-raspi4-unofficial/releases 
4Docker images for Fabric v1.4.2 in arm64 architecture 
https://hub.docker.com/u/haniavis 
under a single Fabric channel and the policy for our chaincode 
required a signature from each of the organizations, since we 
need to ensure that transactions are validated from all the 
DEON nodes. 
The client was hosted by a server equipped with Intel Core 
i7-8650U at 1.9 GHz, 16 GB of RAM and an SSD for storage, 
and it generated 1000 parallel transactions in varied rates 
towards all the nodes’ peers, using the latest release of the 
Fabric SDK Go5. 
B. Analysis of the results 
1) Goal: Our goal is to examine the performance of the 
DEON platform running on devices of limited computational 
power and most specifically on Rpis. We assessed the platform 
as a whole, as well as without the part of pushing data to  
IPFS, since we want to share with the research community 
performance measurements of the latest stable Fabric version 
(v1.4) in arm64 architecture. The impact of using DIDs on   
the performance of the system is left as future work, since we 
use Fabric’s native certificates in our experiments. Moreover, 
we tested two different chaincodes, with and without using 
Fabric’s private data concept, to evaluate this recent addition 
to the Fabric code. 
2) Results: We made end-to-end experiments measuring 
throughput (transactions per second - tps) and latency for 
pushing data to the DEON platform. The client sent transaction 
traffic in rates ranging from 50 tx/sec to 200 tx/sec and we 
measured time for transaction approval according to already 
defined procedures by the Hyperledger community [31]. Fig. 
7a, 7c show the throughput and latency achieved for different 
block sizes and without Fabric’s private data, including or not 
the calls to IPFS. Subsequently, Fig. 7b, 7d show throughput 
and latency achieved with the private data chaincode. 
Overall, we saw acceptable performance for diverse appli- 
cations, reaching up to 100 tps throughput and sub-second 
latency in distinct experiments. However, the results show 
significant overhead on the performance of the platform intro- 
duced by the calls to IPFS and the use of private data in Fabric 
chaincode. This is the cost of securing the data management 
layer and can be tolerated in specific applications like voting, 
where latency is not crucial while security and transparency 
are imperative. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
A. Off-grid communication 
Several proposals related to off-grid networking exist, either 
commercial or community-driven. GoTenna [32], Beartooth 
[33], and Sonnet [34], [35] offer mesh networking technology 
intended to replace walkie-talkie devices and to extend their 
functionality, by connecting a small physical device to the 
user’s smartphone and enabling multimedia messaging, loca- 
tion sharing, and offline maps. The mesh network created by 
Sonnet devices can additionally be connected to the Internet 
5Fabric SDK Go v1.0.0-beta1 https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk- 
go/releases/tag/v1.0.0-beta1 
as long as one node is online. All are proprietary, focus on 
long range versus throughput, and use encryption to secure  
communication, but exhibit limited functionality compared to 
our platform. While encryption suffices for securing messaging 
applications, it is not enough for more elaborate ones that 
involve access control. DEON, in addition to enabling meshing 
(albeit in shorter ranges), surpasses this obstacle via using the 
advanced concept of DIDs. 
LibreMesh  [36]  is  “a  modular  framework   for   creat- 
ing OpenWrt-based firmware for wireless mesh nodes.” Its 
firmware allows “simple deployment of auto-configurable, yet 
versatile, multi-radio mesh networks,” and it uses a dynamic 
routing protocol which makes the entire mesh network look 
like a single LAN to the user. However, it only provides net- 
working infrastructure and no distributed applications, storage 
or access control. 
Rightmesh [37] is a software-based mobile mesh networking 
approach that uses smartphone devices connected in a server- 
less infrastructure. A token is used for incentivization; online 
users can share their Internet connection with off-grid users  
by exchanging tokens. A key difference with DEON is that 
Rightmesh uses Ethereum as the underlying blockchain, and 
only for the token’s purposes, as opposed to DEON, which 
stores also data logistics and DIDs on distributed ledgers. 
Moreover, Rightmesh implies the installation of an Android 
application on the user’s device, while DEON’s operation is 
browser-based and thus non-invasive. Finally, for the token to 
be used in the Rightmesh network, at least in the beginning  
some “superpeers” need to be deployed, which makes the 
architecture depart from the totally decentralized model by 
introducing the need for trusting whoever is in control of those 
nodes. On the contrary, DEON is totally decentralized, with  
no nodes having extra privileges. 
An analog of our platform that uses the current Internet 
infrastructure instead of operating off-grid is the SAFE (Secure 
Access For Everyone) Network [38]. It joins together the spare 
computing resources of its users, creating a global network  
and giving control of  the  data back  to  them. The  software  
is available to download for free and allows for custom 
distributed application development. Users are rewarded with 
a token called “Safecoin” for sharing their hardware and 
network resources. SAFE extends the Kademlia distributed 
hashtable, which is also the one used internally by IPFS, and 
data are encrypted on each user’s computer before they are 
fragmented and spread throughout the network. The effort is 
still in development. We  note that while DEON can support    
a cryptocurrency if needed for a specific application, it is not 
required for the proper function of the platform (i.e. for the 
consensus). 
B. Platforms for Decentralized Data Sharing and Computa- 
tion 
The work closest to ours is [39], where the authors de- 
scribe a framework for data ownership, data transparency and 
auditability, and fine-grained access control. Their network 
consists of users, services, and nodes (nodes maintain the 
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blockchain). They use signatures for identification of users, 
and a single blockchain for both access control and data 
transactions, with the real data distributed and replicated in an 
off-chain Kademlia-based key-value store, with a role similar 
to the one IPFS plays in our solution. The authors define their 
own identity and access control mechanisms, and in addition 
propose Multi-Party Computation (MPC) over encrypted data, 
which we do not consider. 
The Oasis platform [40] wants to provide the infrastructure 
for a decentralized cloud, offering trustless privacy. DFINITY 
[41] is a  “virtual  blockchain  computer”  running  on  top  of 
a peer-to-peer network. Despite the similarities, both these 
platforms operate over the Internet and not off-grid, so their 
focus is different than DEON’s. 
Selimi et al. [42], motivated by the issue of participation 
incentivization in community mesh networks like Guifi [43] – 
with proper compensation for services offered – observe that 
this was being done in a centralized manner, and attempt to 
decentralize this procedure by deploying Hyperledger Fabric 
over Guifi. They do not take identities into consideration 
though, and their description is more at a proof-of-concept 
level, as they only use a single Fabric organization. 
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we introduced DEON, a decentralized data 
sharing infrastructure for deploying privacy-respecting, decen- 
 
tralized applications in off-grid settings, where no access to 
the Internet is available. We designed and implemented a data 
management layer for maintaining the transparency of data  
exchanges and an identity management layer for giving the 
users privacy and self-sovereignty of their identity data, and 
combined these with a decentralized file system and open- 
source off-grid devices that create a mesh network. As a future 
step, we intend to extend the use of DIDs to Fabric network 
components (peers, orderers, MSPs) to further eliminate single 
points of failure. We also intend to study whether the local 
Indy ledger can be removed from the nodes and use the public 
ledger (run by Sovrin) instead. Furthermore, we hope to further 
improve DEON’s performance by experimenting with other 
types of Fabric’s state database (e.g., leveldb) or different 
chaincode policies. In any case, our platform is a step towards 
the realization of the Web  3.0  and  the  decentralization  of 
our vulnerable centralized infrastructure via secure privacy- 
focused distributed alternatives. 
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